The kind of time series that Sober employs in his counterexample are commonplace in macroeconomics. Prices, gross domestic product, consumption, investment, employment, and wages -just to name a few prominent economic time series -trend up in the manner of Sober's bread prices and sea levels. In the past quarter century, statisticians (most notably time-series econometricians) have developed special tools for the analysis of these "nonstationary" time series. One well known exposition of some of the issues in time-series econometrics uses an example analogous to Sober's example, in which the level of the consumer price index plays the role of bread prices and cumulative rainfall in the United Kingdom that of sea levels (Hendry [1980] ). There are several reasons to believe that the principle of the common cause is not a successful foundation for causal analysis (see, for example, Cartwright [1999] , ch. 5, or Hoover [2001] , ch. 4, sect. 3). Nevertheless, the recent work in time-series statistics suggests that Sober's counterexample to the principle of the common cause is defective. If the principle is to be rejected, it must be on some other grounds.
Sober's Argument and the Attempts to Rescue the Principle
The principle of the common cause states that any correlation demonstrates a causal connection between the variables displaying the correlation -either direct or through a third cause. If the connection is through the third cause, then it will screen off the correlation in the sense that the correlation of X and Y conditional on Z (the third or common cause) will be zero. Sober's counterexample is, then, simple: Venetian sea levels and British bread prices are truly correlated and are not causally connected by construction; therefore, neither causes the other and there can be no common cause. The assumption that sea levels and bread prices are truly correlated is central to Sober's argument, and I will challenge it presently. For the moment, however, notice that the evidence he offers is crude but commonsensical: "higher than average sea levels tend to be associated with higher than average bread prices" (Sober [2001] , p. 332). This evidence is born out in a set of artificial data that Sober created to illustrate his counterexample.
2 The familiar correlation statistic (i.e., Pearson's correlation coefficient) for these data is 0.99, a number typically taken to indicate that the two series are, as
Sober concluded on other grounds, "very strongly correlated" (Sober [2001] , p. 332).
Sober considers various attempts to defuse his counterexample, rightly rejecting some as beside the point. There are two that require further scrutiny. First, Sober ([2001] , pp. 332-333) cites an argument that predates his article, traceable to Yule ([1926] ) and revived in Meek and Glymour ([1994] ), to the effect that the counterexample mixes different causal structures and different probability distributions.
On this argument, his counterexample would be closely related to Simpson's paradox.
Sober rejects this on the grounds that it is question begging: "If we only knew the true causal relationships, we would not need principles like (P) to tell us how to infer causal relationships from probabilities" (Sober [2001] , p. 333). Sober would be completely correct if the argument required prior causal knowledge in order to dismiss the counterexample. Yet, as we shall see in Section 4 below, there is an important sense in which the probabilities in the counterexample are in fact not homogeneous through time, 2 The data given in Sober [2001] , p. 334 are: Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  Bread Prices  4  5  6  10  14  15  19  20  Sea Levels  22  23  24  25  28  29  30  31 and there is nothing question begging about inferring the absence of homogeneity from the data. In particular, there is no appeal to prior knowledge of causal structure.
The second attempt to defuse Sober's counterexample, notices that, while the levels of bread prices and the sea may be highly correlated, changes in the levels need not be correlated (Forster [1988] , Papineau [1992] , and Hausman and Woodward [1999] ).
The situation in which the levels are correlated but the changes are not is taken to be a hallmark of the lack of causal connection. Sober argues that this observation does not save the principle of the common cause as stated in (P); rather it shows that it is false.
The bread prices/sea levels example, he believes, would not defeat a weaker version of the principle:
(P*) If events X and Y are correlated and so are changes in X and changes in Y, then either X caused Y, Y caused X, or X and Y are joint effects of a common cause (one that renders X and Y conditionally probabilistically independent). (Sober [2001] , p. 335; emphasis added)
He then constructs further counterexamples, in which two causally unrelated processes are nevertheless correlated in both levels and changes and so violate (P*).
Hoover ([2001] , pp. 164-166) also argues against shifting the focus to changes on different grounds. The critics of Sober's counterexample worry that the correlation between the levels is causally spurious, and suggest that a true causal relationship must also show up in changes. I argue that this may throw the baby out with the bath water:
the application of (P*) may overlook a true causal connection between the levels that does not show up as a correlation between the changes.
Sober is correct that, take as many differences as one likes, there is some way to construct a counterexample analogous to the case of bread prices and sea levels, so that there is no hope in trying to save the principle by weakening it further. Instead, Sober's counterexample is defective at the top level, first, because probabilities are nonhomogeneous in a relevant sense; and, second, because the correlation between levels is not a true correlation in the relevant sense. The next three sections try to make sense of these claims.
Probabilistic Dependence
As Sober ([2001] , p. 343) notes, there are two steps in applying the principle of the common cause. First, correlations are inferred from associations -that is, from actual frequencies in the data. Second, causes are inferred from correlations -that is, from features of the underlying probabilities. The principle of the common cause relates only to the second step. Sober writes as if the first step were unproblematic for purposes of his argument. My central claim is that this assumption is wrong: associations of the bread prices/sea levels type do not, in general, reflect genuine probabilistic dependence and do not imply true correlations in the sense implicit in the principle of the common cause.
Association is not, in general, correlation (as is clearly understood by both Reichenbach [1956], p. 157, and Sober [2001], pp. 333, 343) . That finite draws from probabilistically unconnected distributions might nevertheless be highly correlated is one of the standard difficulties of practical statistics. Calculating how the expected frequency of such spurious correlations changes as sample sizes increase is a key aim of statistical theory. Such small-sample problems to one side, correlations are inferred, not read directly from data (facts of association). What is inferred is a probability model. 3 The pattern of inference that forms the basis for statistics is: the observed facts of association would be highly probable if the data were realizations from a particular model of the probability generating process; therefore, that model is supported by the data.
Although Sober, like other philosophers and applied researchers uses the term "correlation" as if its meaning were obvious, it is rarely clearly defined. One standard dictionary of statistics defines correlation as " [a] general term for interdependence between pairs of variables. See also association" (Everitt [1998] , p. 80; bold in original).
The same dictionary defines association as " [a] general term used to describe the relationship between two variables. Essentially synonymous with correlation" (Everitt [1998] , p. 17). Standard textbooks generally do not define correlation or association at all, but leave the notions implicit in defining measures of correlation or association. For example, the correlation coefficient is defined as:
where cov(. , .) is the covariance, defined by the numerator of the right-hand term; var(. , .) is the variance, defined by the denominator; E( . ) is the mathematical expectations operator; and µ j is the mean of j (j = x or y) (Lindgren [1976], p. 135; Mood, Graybill, Boes [1974] , p. 155).
Statisticians, however, clearly distinguish properties of the sample (the observed data) and properties of the population (the unobserved process that generates the data). It is useful to distinguish between probability (a population property) and frequency (a sample property). Reichenbach's ([1956] ) statement of the principle of the common cause refers to facts of probability. The reference to correlation in Sober's principle (P) also refers to probability. I shall, therefore, draw a parallel distinction to that between probability and frequency and not treat "correlation" and "association" as synonyms.
Instead, I shall use correlation to refer to a population property and association to a sample property. Probabilities are inferred from frequencies, and correlations are inferred from associations. A central message of this essay is that these inferences are not always obvious or straightforward. A co-occurrence may be a mere coincidence and, therefore, not a proper antecedent to the principle of the common cause. 4 Hacking ([1965] ), Mellor ([1971] ) and Cartwright ([1999] , ch. 7) argue that probabilities are not robust facts about the world, always there for the asking. Rather they arise only in special arrangements of parts of the world, in set-ups that have a propensity to display probabilitistic behavior. Cartwright goes too far, perhaps, in arguing that useful probabilities are almost always generated in artificial set-ups (her term is "nomological machines") and only rarely in nature. But the key point remains:
probabilities are not observable, unmediated facts. We can reasonably speak of probabilities only in the context of particular models of the probability-generating process. Observable frequencies and facts of association are, at best, evidence that support inference to particular probability models.
Again, the typical pattern of inference runs: the observed facts of association would be highly probable if a certain probability model governed the generation of those facts. Statistics is largely about getting the "right" model for the facts of association.
The possible models vary inter alia in their degree of specificity (parametric, semiparametric, nonparametric), in the degree of accuracy or approximation claimed for them, and in whether they deal with discrete or continuous variables (or even some complex combinations).
Although these details are beyond our present purpose, it is useful to note that most statistical inference and most of our own probabilistic intuitions are based on stationary probability distributions. There are several concepts of stationarity, all of which have in common the idea that the probability distribution is unaffected by the passage of time.
Definition: A time series (or time-series process or stochastic process) is a random variable (or vector of variables) whose realizations are time ordered (Hamilton [1994] , p. 43). inference, a decision rule is employed which sets a rejection probability (the size of the test, defined as the probability of observing a test statistic larger than the one calculated on the assumption that the sample is correctly described by the probability model). The critical rejection probability is ideally chosen to balance the risks of type I error (rejecting the probability model when it is true) against type II error (accepting the probability 6 The probability density function for the bivariate normal is:
where σ X and σ Y are the standard deviations of X and Y (i.e., , which is just another way of stating the definition of ρ previously given (see Lindgren ([1976] , ch. 10, sec. 2.1). model when it is false).
While sample moments can always be calculated, no inference beyond the current sample is warranted without the mediation of the probability model. Suppose that we wish to use our knowledge of one classroom to extrapolate the probable distribution of heights and weights in another classroom of six-year olds. This can be done only by asserting that the pupils in the second class are like those in the first class and appealing to the probability model. If we can actually measure the heights and weights in the second class, the sample means, variances, and covariances typically will not be identical to those of the first class. Can they be characterized by the same probability model? We can again follow a testing strategy analogous to the test of normality: on the assumption that the true probability model is the one parameterized by equating the sample moments of the first class to the population moments of the model, how probable are the sample moments calculated in the second class? If the probability falls below the threshold, we reject the hypothesis that the same probability model describes both classes.
Originally Simpson's paradox referred to the case in which a positive association in subpopulations disappeared when the whole population was considered. I will use the term, however, to refer to any case in which the statistical associations differ systematically between subpopulations and the whole population (see Hoover [2001] , p.
19, esp. fn. 25 for historical references on Simpson's paradox). One strategy for dealing with Simpson's paradox is to insist on the rule: avoid "mixing populations with different causal structures and different probability distributions" (Sober ([2001] , p. 333). Sober objects to this strategy on the grounds that it saves the principle of the common cause only by depriving it of its epistemic force (Sober ([2001] , p. 333, fn. 4). Again, the argument seems to be that we would already have to know that the populations were mixed in order to apply the rule, which begs the question.
Surely, this is wrong. The standard statistical strategy just described for testing the equality of the population moments between the two classrooms provides evidence for the homogeneity or lack thereof of the probability distributions. It is not, of course, completely decisive. For example, the sample moments of the two classes could be wildly different even though the population moments were identical because of an atypical draw from the distribution. Nonetheless, the probability distribution itself provides a measure of the improbability of such a draw. Such inferences are not free from a priori assumptions -particularly assumptions about the functional form of the probability distribution -yet they are not arbitrary. (The normal distribution is justified through central limit theorems.) And they are not special to the question of homogeneity, Simpson's paradox, or the principle of the common cause, but are the assumptions that lie behind most statistical inference. What is more, they are assumptions about the probability distributions and not about causal structures. The principle of the common cause infers casual structure from probability distributions. Any statistical test is fallible.
It may lead to incorrect inference when applied to the principle of the common cause, just as in every other application. As a result, causal connections may be incorrectly inferred using principle (P). But the inferential chain is from facts of association to conclusions about probability models to conclusions about causal structure. The inferences are oneway. In particular, no causal assumptions are used in the inference of probabilities from facts of association. No questions are begged.
The identification of the population moments with the sample moments and the use of the sample moments to parameterize the probability model is justified under stationarity by the fact that the expected value of the sample moments is, in fact, the corresponding population moment. So, for example,
. Analogous proofs exist for the expectations of sample variances and covariances.
Pearson's correlation coefficient measures the strength of association between two series. It is a normalization of the sample covariance bounded between -1 and +1. 7 We can reasonably assume that the sample correlation coefficient between height and weight for the pupils (r HW ) is positive. Despite the fact that r is called a correlation coefficient, it is, according to the terminology that we have adopted, a sample statistic expressing a fact of association and not a fact of probability. Still, in a stationary world, we can reasonably take the value of r as an estimate of the corresponding population correlation -ρ. Given the maintained probability model, the likelihood of a true correlation of ρ = 0 generating the observed r ≠ 0 can be calculated. This is a measure of statistical significance. It is reasonable to assume that in a class of six-year olds, r HW would be positive and significantly different from zero and that such a fact of association would provide evidence for the true correlation of height and weight (ρ HW ).
As with the sample mean, the expected value of the sample correlation coefficient is the true population correlation coefficient (E(r) = ρ) when the data are generated by a 7 It may defined as
stationary probability distribution. What is more, as the sample size increases, the value of the sample mean, the sample variances, and the sample covariances (and, therefore, the sample correlation coefficient) all converge to their true population values in the sense that deviations from the population value are less and less likely.
Reichenbach's principle of the common cause is defined with respect to the improbability of a coincidental relationship between two events. Sober's principle (P) refers to correlation between two variables. Both require a notion of probabilistic dependence. Probabilistic dependence can be defined as the absence of probabilistic independence.
Definition:
Two variables X and Y are probabilistically independent if P(XY) = P(X)P(Y), where P(XY) is the joint probability of X and Y, P(X) is the (marginal) probability of X and P(Y) is the (marginal) probability of Y. (See Everitt [1998] , p.
163.)
Probabilistic independence implies that the correlation coefficient ρ = 0, but ρ = 0 does not imply independence. 
E(X)E(Y)
, so that X and Y independent implies cov(X, Y) = 0 and, therefore, that ρ XY = 0. A probability distribution may imply expectations that cancel so that cov(X, Y) =0 and ρ XY = 0 even though P(XY) ≠ P(X)P(Y). (Lindgren [1976] , p. 136, gives the example of a symmetric, discrete bivariate distribution in which such cancellation occurs.) 9 Before formally defining "probabilistic independence" as we have just done, Everitt ([1998] , p. 163) says, "Essentially, two events are said to be independent if knowing the outcome of one tells us nothing about the other." This captures the same "rough" idea, although it gives the definition an unnecessarily epistemic cast.
(1)
where the residuals, ε, capture the variability of Y not tracked by variations in X.
Equation (1) is a population relationship. Regressions assign values to the βs using sample data. The regression equation can be written as
where the bs are chosen in such a way that the mean of the implied residuals (e) is zero and the sample covariance between the X and e, which of course depends on the choice of the bs, is zero. . Each is just a normalization of the correlation coefficient, and correlation unlike causation is not directional.
Statistically significant estimates of b 1 provide evidence for probabilistic dependence. As always, that evidence is evaluated on the maintained hypothesis of a probability model. Typically, that probability model is not maintained as a pure act of faith, but because facts of association not used in assessing probabilistic dependence are, conditional on the model, rendered likely. Estimates of b 1 are facts of association and evidence of probabilistic dependence, which is itself a fact of probability -a value for β 1 or ρ.
Nonstationary Time Series
The importance of the stationarity assumption can be highlighted through an extension of the example of the six-year olds. In that case, when we sought to apply the probability model parameterized using one classroom's statistics to another, the comparison was cross-sectional: time was not an issue. We could also apply the probability model over time.
For example, suppose that we observe a sequence of classes of six-year olds, each resident in the same classroom over a number of years. Each year we measure the heights and weights and calculate the sample statistics. It would not be surprising if the same probability model with the same parameters applied to each class in the sequence; that is, it would not be surprising if there were no statistically significant differences between their sample statistics. In this case, the time series would be stationary.
We could instead follow the same class as it grew up and advanced to higher grades. It would be startling if heights and weights did not advance with the age of the pupils. The same stationary probability model could not describe a class of six-year olds and a class of twelve-year olds, six years later. At a minimum, the heights and weights would have risen sufficiently, so that the difference between the sample means of the class at twelve were statistically significantly different from the class at six. The data would be nonstationary. In this case, we nonetheless believe that the heights and weights are probabilistically dependent. We shall return to this case in the next section. In the meantime, what about nonstationary series that are not probabilistically dependent?
Consider the class of six-year olds and now measure height and knowledge of mathematics. It would not be surprising to find that there were no statistically significant correlation between the two. Yet, as years pass, both the heights and the knowledge of the class should increase. Assume that the sample correlation coefficient between height and knowledge among the twelve-year olds is also not significantly different from zero.
Nevertheless, if we were to pool the data from the class at six and the class at twelve, we would surely find that the sample correlation coefficient (r) was positive. Similarly, if for each year from six to twelve, we were to calculate the mean height and mean knowledge for the class to form two time series, the sample correlation between the time series would be positive. only by determining what probability model is justified by the facts of association. The data , for example, could have been generated by a stationary, normal distribution. The large shifts in the sample means, however, suggest that in that case the data would have to have been a highly atypical draw with a near zero probability. They are more likely to have been generated by a nonstationary distribution -that is, one in which the population moments depend on time.
To understand what difference it makes to work with nonstationary data, let us reconsider the case of the pupils. Suppose that we wanted to use the probability model parameterized on a sample to extrapolate, to guess what the value of an-as-yetunobserved additional datum would take. In the cross-sectional example of six-year old pupils, the best guess is that the new observation will take the value of the observed sample mean. This guess is justified by the fact noted in Section 3 that the expected value of the sample mean is, in fact, the population mean. Conditional on the probability model, we could use the sample variance to assign probabilities to the new observation taking values other than the mean.
Time series carry additional structure: the fact that the data are arranged in a specific temporal order. A new observation is generally a later observation. Now suppose that the data are nonstationary, as for example they could be if we calculated the means of height, weight, or knowledge from observing the same group of pupils as they progress through the grades. Again suppose, for example, that we have observed the class from ages six to twelve and want to guess what value the mean height will take at age thirteen. The sample average would be a poor basis for that guess. It is almost certainly too low. The problem is that the true population mean -that is, the expected value of a realization of the variable -now depends on the time. It is no longer related to the sample mean in the simple way that it was with stationary data.
Two important types of nonstationary time series are the "trend stationary" and the "integrated" series. To get our ideas clear we begin with the simpler case.
Definition.
A time series {X t } is trend stationary if, and only if, X t -g(t) = ε t , where g(t) is a deterministic function of t and {ε t } is a weakly stationary time series with mean zero (Hamilton [1994] , p. 435).
Whereas a stationary series with a constant variance is concentrated about its mean, a trend stationary series is concentrated about g(t), where , in general, g(t) takes different values at different times. In principle, g(t) might be a complicated function, but typically it is modeled as a simple function.
To illustrate, consider first a simple nonstationary process -a deterministic trend without any random element. For example the series X t = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20} for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10. The sample mean of the series is m X = 11, but the next value in the sequence is not 11, but 22.
The point generalizes to a trend-stationary processes. Let a series be described by (3)
where ε t is a mean-zero, stationary random variable. (Here g(t) = 2t.) Suppose that at time t = τ we know the value of ε t . What is our best guess for the next observed datum (i.e., X τ+1 )? Answer: E τ (X τ+1 ) = 2(τ+1), where the subscript on the expectations operator indicates that it is based on information up to and including t = τ.
The population mean increases with time and is always greater than the sample mean. This is the sense in which the data are nonhomogeneous: they are drawn from a distribution whose true population mean is different in each period.
The sample correlation coefficient is as misleading as the sample mean as an indicator of the underlying population correlation. It will not serve as a reliable guide to the probabilistic dependence needed to invoke the principle of the common cause.
Consider two time series governed by deterministic trends. One develops as U t = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . } plus a stationary random term, and the other as V t = { 3, 6, 9, 12, . . .} plus a stationary random term. The random terms are assumed to be mean zero and independent of each other; for example, they might be drawn from a normal or a uniform distribution centered on zero.
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Without the random terms, the sample correlation coefficient for U and V is r = +1; that is, they would be perfectly positively correlated. With the random terms and a short sample, of, say, ten periods, r could take virtually any value -positive, negative, high, low. As the sample grows, the nonrandom components of U and V will come to dominate and r will approach +1. But these series are not probabilistically dependent.
The probability distribution of one series is not conditional on the realization of the other.
A particular realization of the random term of U conveys no information about the probability distribution of V, or vice versa.
It is true, as Sober ([2001] ) observes that knowing the value of U (the deterministic trend + the random component) does convey information about the value of V. But none of this information is probabilistic. It arises only because the deterministic components of both U and V are functions of time.
12 Any well functioning time piece conveys information about any other. But an unpredictable stoppage of, say, your mantel 11 It is trivial to create such series on Microsoft Excel or some other spreadsheet and to use them to verify the claims made here for their properties. 12 One might be tempted to say that time is a common cause of both series. This is a deeply unattractive suggestion for a variety of reasons that would take us too far afield for present purposes.
clock does not give you reason to think that your wristwatch has stopped as well.
Another way to see this is to observe that, were one to predict the value of U 6 on the basis of information up to t = 5, the probabilistic accuracy of that prediction would not improve from knowing V 6 . It is the hallmark of probabilistic dependence that knowing the realizations of one series would improve the predictions of the dependent series. Here it does not.
Notice that nothing whatsoever has been said about causality. The issue is not whether observed associations sometimes do not warrant causal inferences according to the principle of the common cause. Rather it is whether observed associations do not warrant the inference that two series are correlated in the sense of being probabilistically dependent. When data are nonstationary, association generally implies neither true correlation nor probabilistic dependence.
Once again, it is reasonable to view this as a case of Simpson's paradox. The true population mean at each time is different. Each observation can be seen as drawn from a different subsample. For example, imagine that time could be rerun so that we had a million realizations of the processes that generate U and V -each differing according to the different realizations of the stationary error term. At each time, say t = τ 1 , there
would be a million observations of U τ1 and V τ1 . Given the way in which these data are generated, there is a very low probability of a statistically significant sample correlation between them. Similarly, the data at a different time, say t = τ 2 ≠ τ 1 , there would be another population described by different stationary probability distribution with a different mean. Again, there is a low probability that U τ2 and V τ2 have a statistically significant sample correlation. Because the means are clearly different, the subpopulations are not homogeneous. And yet, if we pool the subpopulations and calculate the sample correlation between U τ1 ∪ U τ2 and V τ1 ∪ V τ2 , then the sample correlation is likely to be significant -the more likely, the longer the gap between τ 1 and τ 2 (that is, the more likely, the less homogenous the subsamples). This is precisely the form of Simpson's paradox. And yet, it would not be a good idea to stop with showing that Simpson's paradox arises in nonstationary data, for the differences between the subsamples defined by the nonstationary data are not arbitrary, but are structured in a way that may permit avenues of probabilistic dependence opaque to statistical methods that rely solely on stationary probability models. I return to this point in the next section.
In the meantime, let us consider the U and V processes somewhat further. The sample correlation of the first differences of the series (∆U t and ∆V t ) is statistically insignificantly different from r = 0 in a long sample. Commenting on the analogous situation with respect to bread prices and sea levels, Sober ([2001] , p. 334) argues that such a fact about changes gives no ground to dismiss the observed correlation in levels because "higher than average bread prices are correlated with higher than average sea levels" (emphasis in the original).
Sober's statement equivocates on the word "average." It is true that higher than sample mean bread prices are associated with higher than sample mean sea levels. But the necessary sense of "average" is population mean, not sample mean. And, as we have already seen, the two do not coincide for trend-stationary time series with deterministic trends. In fact, the relationship of any observed value to the sample mean is not a stable fact in such a nonstationary case. For example, ignoring the random terms, the sample mean of the first four observations of U t is 2.5. One half of the sample is above the sample mean and one half below. But, if we could observe four more terms, the sample mean increases to 4.5, and every one of the first four terms would be below the sample mean. In contrast, with a stationary distribution, such flip-flopping of status occurs only randomly and with a high probability only for values that are closer and closer to the population mean as sample size increases. He concludes from this that the levels of bread prices and sea levels are probabilistically dependent. Once stated correctly in terms of population means, the claim is false for trend-stationary data.
This last point is crucial. Sober rejects the principle of the common cause because two series that are not causally connected ex hypothesi are nevertheless correlated. Yet, the supposed correlation is a sample association. In the most likely probability model consistent with the data -a nonstationary model -such sample association does not necessarily correspond to probabilistic dependence.
Principle (P) would naturally be applied to the stationary components of a pair of trend stationary time series. It will generally be misleading, as in Sober's example, if applied to series including their nonstationary trends. Equations (1) and (2) can be applied to stationary time series or to the stationary components of trend stationary time series with two modifications. First, we must account for the time order -notated by time subscripts on the variables and the residuals. Second, the residuals must be white noise.
Definition: A series {ε t } is (weak) white noise if it is mean zero with a finite
variance and cov(ε t ε s ) = E(ε t ε s ) = 0 for all t ≠ s (Hendry [1995] , p. 39).
The definition says, that residuals are white noise when there are no correlations between residuals at different times.
Sober ([2001] , p. 335) also describes a process with a stochastic (i.e., a random, as opposed to a deterministic) trend. It is useful to look at this case as well because it prepares the ground for the next section. Sober's example illustrates the second major type of nonstationary time series, the "integrated" time series. A series is integrated if its stochastic elements cumulate without loss over time. For example, in the series X t = X t-1 + ε t , where the ε t are weakly stationary random shocks, the value k periods in the future can be written as X t+k = X t-1 + ε t + ε t+1 + ε t+2 + . . . + ε t+k . In such a process, a shock at t = 1, call it ε 1 will contribute its full value to X t , not only at t = 1, but at t = 100 and t = 100,000, and every period that occurs after t = 1. As k goes to infinity, the effect of an individual shock never dwindles away. Similarly, the initial condition, X t-1 , fully contributes to the value of X t+k at every period. An integrated time series "remembers" its past. While one can always calculate the sample mean of an integrated series, the series does not tend to revert to its sample mean, but instead drifts about depending on the particular realizations of the εs.
In contrast, consider the time series X t = 0.5X t-1 + ε t . The value k periods in the future can be written as X t+k = 0.5
ε t+2 + . . . + 0.5ε t+k-1 + ε t+k . A shock at t = 1 will contribute its full value to X t only at t = 1. At t = 100, it contributes only 0.5 99 ε 1 = (1.58 x 10 -30 )ε 1 , and, as k goes to infinity, the effect of an individual shock dwindles away rapidly. Similarly, the contribution of the initial condition dwindles rapidly as k increases. Such a series is stationary, even though values of X close together in time may be correlated (i.e., {X t } is not white noise}. A stationary time series "forgets" its past. And, while over a short enough sample, it may display systematic deviation from its sample mean, over long samples it displays mean reversion.
The stochastic process X t = X t-1 + ε t is one example of a nonstationary process.
There are other processes that cumulate stochastic shocks in different patterns. These can be categorized by their order of integration. Define the difference operator:
The difference operator transforms levels of variables into changes. The difference operator can be applied to a series that has already been differenced, so that
indicates that the series has been differenced d times.
Definition: Consider a time series {X t } that is neither stationary nor trend stationary. Let d be the minimum integer such that {∆ d X t } is weakly stationary.
Then {X t } is said to be integrated of order d, which is notated I(d). (By convention, a stationary time series is notated as I(0).)
An integrated series is not weakly stationary. Weak stationarity can be tested using standard statistical procedures that amount to tests of subsample homogeneity.
Most macroeconomic time series appear to be I(1) -that is, they are not stationary, but their first differences are. The series X t = X t-1 + ε t is I(1). Some appear to be I(2). An example of an I(2) process is: X t = X t-1 + ∆X t-1 + ε t . And only a very few appear to be I(0) -that is, their levels are stationary.
Sober's particular example is a (possibly asymmetric) two-state, discrete Markov process. We look instead at a more tractable, but closely related, continuous process.
We have already seen a typical example of an I(1) nonstationary process:
where ε t is a draw from a weakly stationary stochastic process. Notice that the population mean -as we should expect in a nonstationary series -is not constant: E(X t ) = X t-1 . In fact, the series describes the famous "random walk" in which the best expectation of today's value is yesterday's value.
Time order introduces considerable mathematical complexity into the characterization of the probability distributions of integrated time series, involving such notions as Wiener processes (Brownian motion) and functional central-limit theorems.
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One critically important result of this analysis is relevant to the bread prices/sea levels example. Suppose that we have two series, {Y t } and {Z t }, each fully described by an equation like (4) in which the two stationary time series of errors (the ε t ) are probabilistically independent. One realization of each series assigns random values to each ε Yt and ε Zt and generates each Y t and Z t according to an equation like (4). We could, of course, generate many such realizations with different random values for the εs, and different Ys and Zs. What happens if we calculate the sample correlation coefficient, r, for each realization? If the process had been stationary, the frequency distribution of r would tend to center on the population correlation coefficient, ρ, and would tend to become more concentrated on ρ (i.e., to have a smaller variance around it) as the number of realizations and the length of each sample realization became large.
In contrast, with nonstationary series the sample correlation coefficient (r) between the two series does not get closer and closer to the population correlation (ρ). In the case of time series such as Y and Z, which are both I(1), the distribution of values of r is close to uniform over the interval -1 to +1 (see Hendry [1995] , p. 128). This means that every value of r will show up with about the same probability in different realizations of the two processes, even though there is no connection whatsoever between them.
In general, unlike the case of stationary time series, the frequency distribution of the sample statistics of nonstationary time series do not center on a single population value, but display a stable distribution of values. To take another example, if both series are I(2), the weight of the distribution of r is heavily concentrated in the tails, so that there is a very high and nearly equal probability of finding r to be either -1 or +1 and a low probability of finding any value in between.
Despite the apparent correlation, there is once again no probabilistic dependence in these cases. The distribution of one series is not conditional on a realization of the other series. A striking result, underscores the lack of probabilistic dependence. As the sample sizes grow, the variance of the difference between the two series approaches infinity. This last result says that, even though the series appear to be highly correlated, they do not tend toward parallel paths; indeed, they may drift infinitely far apart.
Probabilistic Dependence in Nonstationary Time Series
The strategy of concentrating on the changes, rather than the levels, of nonstationary time series might seem to gain considerable support from the analysis of the last section. The first difference of the integrated series X t in (4) is ∆X t = X t -X t-1 = ε t , a stationary random process in which sample moments provide evidence for their straightforwardly analogous population moments. Similarly, the first differences of the trend-stationary series U and V would be two independent random terms. A lack of a statistically significant r statistic would provide evidence that ∆U and ∆V were not correlated in population. But, as mentioned in Section 2, this application of (P*) may throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Recall the case of measuring the heights and weights of a class as it progressed from ages six to twelve. The connection between height and weight among the pupils at a particular time (i.e., in the cross-section) is likely to be genuine. Equally, the connection between the time series of the average heights and weights is also likely to be genuine. Yet, it does not follow from this last connection that there will be a close connection between the change in height and the change in weight. For example, suppose that the probabilistic process governing them is:
(5)
where ω and ν are independent, stationary random variables and 0 < γ < 1. Of course, it is also possible for series to be dependent in both changes and levels.
For example, replace (5) with (7) ∆W t =δ∆H t + ω t .
Now ∆H and ∆W are also probabilistically dependent.
Notice that in (6) There is a further analogy with the correlation coefficient. Notice that the cointegrating relationship in the definition has the same form as (1). Just as the regression equation (2) chooses the weights for this linear combination such that a pair of stationary series is reduced to a series of residual error terms uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables,
chooses the weights of the cointegrating vector in such a way that a pair of nonstationary variables is reduced to a series of stationary residuals (e t ). Now, however, even if the underlying random error terms (e.g., ω and ν in (5) and (6) must place a small probability on their co-occurrence; and yet, they do in fact co-occur.
In that case the common cause justifies a wider probability model that makes their cooccurrence follow as a matter of course.
Bread prices in England and the sea levels in Venice do not have a common cause ex hypothesi. But to establish that they violate the principle, the fact of their observable, positive association would have to be interpretable as a true correlation and, therefore, as an improbable coincidence in Reichenbach's sense. As described in Sober's counterexample, the two time series are clearly nonstationary -trend stationary or integrated. The positive sample association between such nonstationary series is not improbable. Indeed, such observed associations between time series that lack any probabilistic dependence are the mathematical implication of nonstationary stochastic processes. They are highly predictable, and yet are mere coincidences. As a result, when, given the data, the most likely probability model is nonstationary, it is wrong to infer probabilistic dependence from Pearson's correlation coefficient or other formal or informal measures of association that would have provided good evidence for it in the stationary case. The time series are associated but not correlated in the sense required for the principle of the common cause. This is enough to justify the conclusion that Venetian sea levels and British bread prices do not provide a valid counterexample to the principle of the common cause.
Not all nonstationary time series are probabilistically independent as are sea levels and bread prices. Cointegration is the probabilistic dependence between the levels of nonstationary time series. The term "correlation" in the sense relevant to
Reichenbach's principle of the common cause encompasses cointegration. Far from needing to weaken (P*) to cope with Sober's counterexample, our analysis shows that principle (P) is fine as it is.
This conclusion may be thought to employ too elastic a definition of "correlation," one that does violence to common usage. Sober's counterexample might reasonably be held to highlight a need to clarify key terms. So, even though, I argue that Sober's counterexample does not need to be replaced by any weaker principle, it might be clearer to restate (P) more expansively (with the clarifying phrases in italics):
(P**) If events X and Y are each stationary or trend stationary and are correlated with each other or are each integrated and cointegrated with each other, then either X caused Y, Y caused X, or X and Y are joint effects of a common cause (one that renders X and Y probabilistically independent).
18
Venetian sea levels and British bread prices are nonstationary, and they are not cointegrated. They fail to fulfill the antecedent of (P**), and so are not a counterexample to the principle of the common cause.
19
The principle of the common cause may be open to valid criticism on many grounds. What we have shown here is that the case of Venetian sea levels and British bread prices is not one of them.
18 Cointegration was defined in Section 4 as a linear combination that reduces an I(1) series to an I(0) series. But the notion generalizes to a linear combination that reduces an I(k) series to an I(k-1) series. Such a generalization is adequate to defuse Sober's [(2001) , Section 3) new counterexamples. These work through the construction of two time series that are not causally connected ex hypothesi but in which both the levels and the changes of the series are correlated in sample in violation of (P*). Such series are not cointegrated, so that they do not violate (P**). Without further discussion, we start with the fact established informally in the text that W and H are I(1). The salient question then is, whether there is a linear combination of W and H that is I(0)? We prove that (H t -W t ) is in fact I(0). Rewrite (5) and (6) Lagging (9) and repeatedly substituting out the lagged term k times yields Since γ < 1, as k → ∞, the first term on the right-hand side vanishes. The summation places weights that decline over time on a linear combination of I(0) error terms. The further a shock to W (i.e., ω) or to H (i.e., ν) lies in the past, the less it matters to the current value of (H t -W t ). This is the hallmark of an I(0) process. Since, H t -W t is I(0), H and W are cointegrated.
Appendix. Proof that the
We can also prove that the cointegrating vector is unique. Let (5) and (6) describe the relationship between H and W. Now compute, an arbitrary linear combination (11) (H t -αW t ) = (1 -γ)H t-1 + γW t-1 + ν t -αW t-1 -αω t = (H t-1 -αW t-1 ) -γ(H t-1 -W t-1 ) + ν t -αω t . If α = 1, then (11) collapses to (9) and (H t -αW t ) is I(0). If α ≠ 1, notice that (11) takes the form X t = X t-1 + I(0) terms, which is an I(1) process. To see this another way, ask what happens if we repeatedly lag (H t -αW t ) and substitute out the lagged values in (11) as we did in moving from (9) Unlike in (10), as k → ∞, the first term on the right-hand side does not vanish and the weights on the terms in the summation of I(0) terms do not decline. The process "remembers" its initial conditions and the full value of every past shock, which is the hallmark of an I(1) process.
Since α = 1 implies that (H t -αW t ) is I(0) and α ≠ 1 implies that (H t -αW t ) is I(1), therefore the cointegrating vector [α] is unique.
